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Preface: The aim of this essay is to present an overview of some of the basic concepts 
underlying the mainstream approach to the role of economics in the analysis of the 
causes and treatment of environmental degradation. It evaluates the mainstream view 
depicted by Helm and Pearce and analyses economic externalities in context, 
conventional economic approaches and imperfect information. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper concentrates on one approach to the problem of environmental 
degradation, an approach which might be termed "the mainstream".  There is an 
alternative radical approach, the main proponent of which is Richard Douthwaite. 
 
The mainstream view is essentially that, while it is a matter for the physical sciences 
to assess the present and forecast the future extent of environmental problems, it is in 
the domain of the social sciences, specifically economics, that solutions should be 
sought.  This is so, mainstream proponents contend, because the underlying cause of 
environmental problems is human behaviour.  Given that human attitudes towards the 
environment are unlikely to change in the short term, if at all, the task of economics is 
therefore to internalise the environment within economic calculations. (Helme and 
Pearce 1991). 
 
 
The “Mainstream” view 
 
Economists have progressed since the seventies from a view of environmental issues 
as localised examples of externalities, which had no major effect on the reasonably 
efficient workings of market economies.  The globalisation of these issues together 
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with theoretical work on their pervasiveness in economic life led to consideration of 
the possibility of their internalisation. (Helme and Pearce 1991). 
 
Environmental effects are externalities i.e. their costs and benefits are not fully 
reflected in market exchanges.  They represent incomplete or missing markets. 
 
Because environmental assets are not marketable, quantitative methods must be 
devised in order to bring them within the ambit of meaningful policy measures.  The 
alternative is to leave the existing environmental structure untouched which does not 
constitute a policy. 
 
Since the information is incomplete, policy initiatives will of necessity be imperfect.  
Nevertheless, a substantial pay-off to early implementation of policy is expected 
because of long lags and possible irreversible effects.  In short, any coherent action 
now is better than awaiting an optimal model before intervening. (Helme and Pearce 
1991). 
 
 
Treatment of Environmental Externalities. 
 
Helm et al classify externalities under their institutional contexts, examine some 
policy instruments for internalising them and deal with the problems of information 
associated with them.   
 
 
Institutional Context: 
 
(a) Number of Polluters/Pollutees 
 
There are three cases: 
 
(1) "One-to-One":  This is a special case, the simplicity of which 
commends it to modellers.  The culprit and injured party are easily identified 
and the damages are amenable to measurement.  Solutions may be by way of 
taxes/subsidies or through negotiation/bargaining. 
 
Regulation and prosecution by the Control Authorities is also relatively 
straightforward. 
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(2) "One-to-Many": Chemical spillages and oil tanker disasters are 
examples.  The search for a solution becomes more complex due to the 
difficulty of measuring the environmental damage and of organising co-
operative measures on the part of the victims who are many.  Recourse is 
typically had to the political and regulatory process in such cases. 
 
(3) "Many-to-Many":   Ozone depletion and build-up of greenhouse 
gases are examples.  These are referred to as global mutual extrenalities.  The 
complexities increase due to the ubiquity of sources.  Problems of exhaustive 
identification arise  and emissions data is costly to collect.  An element of self-
regulation may be introduced with inevitable drawbacks.  Income effects can 
also be encountered due to the inelasticity of demand associated with such 
products as energy and transport, which typically are affected by 
environmental control costs. 
 
(b) Jurisdictions: 
 
Where externalities are confined within national borders, existing taxation and 
regulatory systems can be adapted to take account of environmental policy.  
However when environmental problems transcend borders, national 
systems/laws are ineffective and the will to support international law is 
suspect.  In this instance the benefits to the transgressors outweigh the costs of 
flouting international convention. 
 
 
(c) Economic Systems: 
 
The emphasis in planned economies is on production rather than consumption.   
The consequences of environmental degradation will therefore not be 
accorded the same level of priority as in market economies.  The use of policy 
instruments such as marketable permits and property rights is pre-empted by 
the nature of planned economies. 
 
The developing world has particular concerns over environmental quality as it 
relies heavily on the direct use of natural resources e.g. wood for fuel, direct 
drawing of water.  They are also particularly sensitive to natural disasters. 
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Differences due to economic systems need to be factored into any modelled 
solution of the environmental question. 
 
 
Economic Policy Instruments 
 
Conventional Economic Approaches: 
 
Two are examined;  the Pigouvian (after Pigou, 1920), which is based on 
pragmatism and the Coasean (after Coase, 1960), which relies on free market 
theory. 
 
(a) Pigouvian Taxes/Subsidies: 
 
Pigou sought to internalise "economic" welfare, i.e. that part of general 
welfare which he considered amenable to cash measurement.  He attempted, 
by means of taxes and subsidies to correct for social costs, which did not form 
part of the normal market.  The Pigouvian approach accordingly is to impose a 
tax on the polluter and to pay a subsidy to the victim.  The disbursement of tax 
revenue is considered to be a matter for government. 
 
Strengths of the Pigouvian approach are: 
 
1. The recognition that environmental damage involves a cost which must 
be borne in some form by the generator. 
2. There is a presumption in favour of the principle of "the polluter pays".  
There is no question of the victim paying. 
3. A pragmatic approach - each case is taken on its merits. 
 
Weaknesses are: 
 
(i) It is assumed that there are no other market failures, an unlikely 
scenario.  Pigouvian theory assumes that there will be no distortion of the 
market as all polluters are affected by taxes and that as a consequence, they 
will face the true marginal costs of production.  This is too simplistic. 
(ii) The approach is informationally very demanding. Perfect information 
is assumed, e.g., no strategic manipulation of information, no uncertainty 
about environmental impact. 
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(b) Laissez faire. 
 
The Coasean school asserts that since externalities are the results of the 
absence of markets and their associated property rights, a market in which all 
assets were owned would internalise all externalities.  If ownership of the 
"commons" of land sea and air could be established, remedies could be found 
for environmental degradation through the market or ultimately through the 
vindicators of private property, the courts. 
 
Strengths of the Coasean Approach: 
 
(i) It proposes a value - free approach to pollution.  It is immaterial 
(economically) whether the polluter (taxes) or the pollutee pays (bribes).  This 
is empirically valid.  One method used to discourage pollution by poor nations 
is by bribes in the form of subsidies or technological expertise? 
 
(ii) It introduces the idea of international co-operation e.g. the idea of 
inducements to encourage nations to play the game even when it is perceived 
that there is no advantage to be gained by the new player. 
 
Weaknesses: 
 
1. It envisages well functioning markets and does not address the 
 complexities introduced by monopolies. 
2. It does not address the complexities introduced by the presence of 
 multiple parties in the bargaining process.  Efficiency is lost due to the 
 likelihood of free-riders and increased transaction costs. 
3. It is not clear who bargains for future generations. 
 
Both approaches suffer a common drawback.  Their underlying assumptions 
(that markets function well) are at odds with the intrusion of environmental 
problems in real world situations.  
 
Imperfect Information. 
 
The real world is devoid of simple full information models such as the 
Pigouvian and the Coasean.  Precise information on the nature of externalities 
and the costs and benefits associated with possible solutions is lacking.  
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Uncertainty is present everywhere when we come to consider environmental 
problems. 
 
This imperfect information (uncertainty) raises some questions. 
 
1. How are individual firms and countries to be inveigled to reveal 
 information which is private to them? 
2. Given that future research will increase the flow of information, do we 
 wait for an optimal model/better technology or do we act now?  The 
 question of costs and benefits is germane here.  Pragmatism suggests 
 that any decision should be based on such analysis. 
3. Cost-benefit analysis raises a further question. How do we 
scientifically  model uncertainty?  How do we factor in a subjective expected 
utility  loss, a risk preference and the marginal costs of pollution control? 
(Helm and Pearce 1991). 
 
 Since the assumption of such factors is highly questionable in the complex 
area of global externalities, parameters within which the problems should be 
modelled should be sought by way of best and worst case scenarios. 
SUMMARY 
 
Helm and Pearce favour a scientific analytical approach towards externalities.  They 
examine the assumptions of simple modelled solutions and expand on these by 
focussing on the complexities introduced by institutional contexts, jurisdictions, 
economic systems and imperfect information.  They favour pragmatic attempts at 
solutions and are confident that these attempts are the bailiwick of economists. On the 
other hand Douthwaite adopts a holistic approach to the same problems. 
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